Can better instructions lead to a better deal?
Imagine asking an AI to negotiate a purchase for you. You could tell it to hold firm, look for useful tradeoffs, or simply get you a good deal. Would those instructions change the outcome?
We tested that question by giving AI buyers different instructions and sending them into the same set of bargaining situations. To understand the results, start with one of those situations and watch what actually happened.
A buyer, a seller, and a package of terms.
A scenario is one constructed bargaining situation. It sets what the buyer values, what the seller’s offer costs to provide, and what each can get if they walk away. The negotiators then choose whether to agree and on which terms.
In this saved example, a collaborative AI buyer negotiates with a neutral AI seller. They can bargain over price, delivery speed, support and payment timing. Each knows its own values, but not the other side’s private numbers.
Faster delivery and better support are valuable.
The basic package is worth 110. Rush delivery adds 25 and extended support adds 20. Paying later adds no value here. Walking away is worth 0.
Those extras cost little to provide.
The basic package costs 80. Rush delivery and extended support add no cost in this scenario; payment in 60 days adds 10. Walking away is worth 20.
These private numbers are shown to you to explain the example. They were not shared between the agents. This case was selected after collection to illustrate the game.
The seller opens at 180, including rush delivery, extended support and payment in 60 days. The buyer counters at 110 with standard payment. As they exchange offers, the buyer asks which terms are cheapest for the seller to provide.
A deal in nine turns
“$180 with rush delivery, extended support, and net60 payment.”
Rush delivery · Extended support · Pay in 60 days
Read the full public transcript
- seller: $180 with rush delivery, extended support, and net60 payment.
- buyer: I offer $110 for rush delivery, extended support, and standard payment. Which terms are least costly for you?
- seller: I can include rush delivery and extended support at $150 with standard payment.
- buyer: $125 for rush delivery, extended support, and standard payment. Which costs you less: rush delivery or extended support?
- seller: $140 with rush delivery, extended support, and standard payment.
- buyer: $130 for rush delivery, extended support, and standard payment. Keeping standard payment supports this price.
- seller: Let's meet at $135 with rush delivery, extended support, and standard payment.
- buyer: I can close at $130 with rush delivery, extended support, and standard payment.
- seller: Agreed: $130 with rush delivery, extended support, and standard payment.
An illustrative example selected after collection, not a representative sample. Dollar signs are verbatim from the synthetic game; no goods or money changed hands.
The seller does not explicitly answer those cost questions. The offers move closer together: 150, 125, 140, 130, 135. The buyer holds at 130, and the seller accepts. The final deal includes rush delivery, extended support and standard payment.
Now we can calculate the scores.
The buyer receives something worth 155 and pays 130, leaving a gain of 25. The seller receives 130, spends 80, and gives up a walkaway alternative worth 20, leaving a gain of 30.
These points measure how much better each side does than walking away. They come from the game’s numbers, not a judge’s opinion of the conversation. A walkaway gives both sides zero gain. No real goods or money changed hands.
The seller earned more in this example, while both sides benefited. The deal also captured all the available joint gain: the buyer got valuable extras that cost this seller nothing, and standard payment avoided an unnecessary cost. We can observe that result without claiming to know which message caused it.
Four ways to buy. Three kinds of seller.
We repeated this kind of negotiation across 180 scenarios. The AI buyers used the same underlying model; what changed was their instruction package. A programmed buyer supplied a rule-based comparison.
Select a strategy or scenario type below to read its instructions, rules or an example in the appendix.
| Buyer strategy | Instructions or decision rule |
|---|---|
| Neutral AI ↗ | Given the buyer’s objective, without the firm or collaborative instruction package. |
| Firm AI ↗ | Given instructions for a firmer bargaining approach. |
| Collaborative AI ↗ | Given instructions to look for useful tradeoffs. |
| Programmed ↗ | Follows a fixed bargaining policy instead of generating its decisions with an AI model. |
| Seller strategy | Instructions or decision rule |
|---|---|
| Early concessions ↗ | A programmed seller that makes concessions earlier. |
| Late concessions ↗ | A programmed seller that holds out longer before conceding. |
| Neutral AI ↗ | An AI given the seller’s objective, using the same model configuration as the AI buyers. |
The programmed sellers respond according to rules; they do not interpret persuasive language. The firm buyer was instructed to open ambitiously and concede cautiously; the collaborative buyer was instructed to explore priorities and useful tradeoffs. These change bargaining behavior as well as tone.
Three kinds of bargaining situation
| Scenario type | What makes it different | Count |
|---|---|---|
| Tradeoffs ↗ | Delivery, support and payment terms offer opportunities to improve the deal. | 60 |
| Narrow agreement zone ↗ | There is relatively little room for a mutually acceptable deal. | 60 |
| No agreement zone ↗ | No available contract is at least as good as walking away for both sides. | 60 |
Every scenario was assigned all 12 buyer–seller combinations. That gives 180 × 4 × 3 = 2,160 assigned negotiations, with one run of each combination. The AI agents used openai/gpt-6.1-sol, medium reasoning and fresh contexts.
With the setup and scoring in place, we can ask what the different pairings earned.
What did each side earn?
Each cell below shows the average buyer gain and seller gain across the same 180 scenarios. Both numbers matter: a strong buyer score does not automatically mean the seller earned less.
| Buyer strategy | Early concessions seller | Late concessions seller | Neutral AI seller |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neutral AI | 13.08 / 6.47 | 7.67 / 12.17 | 11.92 / 8.97 |
| Firm AI | 13.25 / 6.08 | 7.53 / 12.08 | 11.61 / 9.03 |
| Collaborative AI | 14.31 / 6.53 | 8.31 / 12.22 | 11.94 / 9.31 |
| Programmed | 11.28 / 7.14 | 5.19 / 9.03 | 9.06 / 10.44 |
Means include all assigned negotiations, including walkaways and zero scores recorded for infrastructure failures. Those failure zeros are not observed strategic outcomes. How failed runs affect the results →
Against the early-conceding seller, every buyer strategy earned more on average than the seller. Against the late-conceding seller, every buyer strategy earned less. Against the neutral AI seller, the three AI buyers were ahead on average; the programmed buyer was behind.
What each side earned, by opponent
All 12 matchups, including joint gains
| Buyer / seller | Buyer gain | Seller gain | Combined gain | Agreements | Failures |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Neutral / Early concessions | 13.08 | 6.47 | 19.56 | 109/180 | 2 |
| Neutral / Late concessions | 7.67 | 12.17 | 19.83 | 105/180 | 1 |
| Neutral / Neutral AI | 11.92 | 8.97 | 20.89 | 106/180 | 3 |
| Firm / Early concessions | 13.25 | 6.08 | 19.33 | 108/180 | 0 |
| Firm / Late concessions | 7.53 | 12.08 | 19.61 | 107/180 | 0 |
| Firm / Neutral AI | 11.61 | 9.03 | 20.64 | 109/180 | 2 |
| Collaborative / Early concessions | 14.31 | 6.53 | 20.83 | 114/180 | 1 |
| Collaborative / Late concessions | 8.31 | 12.22 | 20.53 | 108/180 | 2 |
| Collaborative / Neutral AI | 11.94 | 9.31 | 21.25 | 107/180 | 3 |
| Programmed / Early concessions | 11.28 | 7.14 | 18.42 | 119/180 | 0 |
| Programmed / Late concessions | 5.19 | 9.03 | 14.22 | 109/180 | 0 |
| Programmed / Neutral AI | 9.06 | 10.44 | 19.50 | 107/180 | 0 |
The programmed buyer reached the most agreements, with 335 out of its 540 assignments, yet had the lowest average buyer gain. This ordering is not robust: the programmed buyer's lead over collaborative (329 agreements) is exactly 6, which equals collaborative's 6 infrastructure failures. If those 6 cases had reached agreements, the lead would disappear. Agreement alone therefore would have given a different impression of performance.
The table also makes the next question more precise. Within the same mix of sellers and scenarios, how much did changing the buyer’s instructions help?
Changing the instructions made modest differences.
The firm AI buyer averaged 10.80 points, close to the neutral buyer’s 10.89. The collaborative buyer averaged 11.52, an observed improvement of 0.63 points over neutral.
Warning: this +0.63 difference is not robust. Fourteen negotiations ended in infrastructure failures with unknown outcomes. If those missing outcomes are filled in unfavourably to collaborative, the difference becomes −0.81, with a 99% interval of −2.62 to +0.59, which includes zero. Treat collaborative as "looked slightly better in the observed runs," not as a proven winner.
See how failed runs affect this comparison in the appendix →All three AI buyer strategies averaged more than the programmed buyer’s 8.51 points. The largest of the five planned comparisons was collaborative versus programmed, at 3.01 points.
“Be firm” earned almost the same average score as the neutral instructions in the recorded results. Collaborative instructions had a small positive average difference. The largest observed improvement across the five comparisons was about three points, below the five-point improvement the study had set as its practical benchmark.
The size of the difference also depended on the opponent. Against the neutral AI seller in the chart above, the collaborative and neutral buyers were almost level: 11.94 versus 11.92 points.
These averages varied by seller and scenario. For example, collaborative instructions earned slightly more than neutral instructions overall, but slightly less in tradeoff scenarios against the neutral AI seller. See the detailed comparisons in the appendix →
That answers our original question within this setup. The buyer-and-seller table raised a second question: when the same AI negotiates on both sides, does one role tend to earn more?
Was there an advantage to being the buyer?
One result in the table caught our attention. With neutral AI on both sides, the buyer averaged 11.92 points and the seller 8.97 across all 180 scenarios. We wanted to understand whether that gap suggested an advantage to the buyer’s role, or reflected the situations we had put the agents in.
First, did the scenarios offer both sides the same potential gain?
We checked the deals available in each scenario and found that 13 gave the buyer a higher maximum possible gain than the seller. After setting those 13 aside, the buyer’s average lead fell from 2.94 to 1.14 points.
That leaves 167 scenarios, including 60 where no mutually acceptable deal existed. In those 60, no available contract was at least as good as walking away for both sides.
Walking away creates no additional gain from the negotiation. Each side keeps its alternative. In our earlier example, the seller could get 20 elsewhere; walking away would preserve that 20, but its negotiation score would be zero because it earned nothing above that alternative.
Those 60 cases test whether the agents avoid a bad deal. Here, 58 ended in walkaway and two had technical failures; no agreement was recorded. Among the remaining 107 scenarios, where a mutually acceptable deal was possible, who gained more?
| Scenarios included | Number | Mean buyer gain | Mean seller gain | Buyer − seller |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All scenarios | 180 | 11.92 | 8.97 | +2.94 |
| After removing the 13 with unequal maximum gains | 167 | 9.40 | 8.26 | +1.14 |
| Of those 167: no mutually acceptable deal possible | 60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Of those 167: a deal possible, with equal maximum gains | 107 | 14.67 | 12.90 | +1.78 |
The last two rows divide the 167-scenario group into 60 and 107. The averages include recorded zeros for technical failures, whose strategic outcomes are unknown. Differences are calculated before rounding. All no-deal results · Scenario definitions and the other pairings.
That brings us to 107 scenarios where a mutually acceptable deal existed and the buyer’s maximum achievable gain equaled the seller’s. Their best outcomes could come from different contracts; equal maxima do not mean identical bargaining positions.
In these scenarios, the buyer averaged 14.67 points and the seller 12.90. The buyer earned 1.78 points more on average. We retained all 107 assignments, including 13 walkaways where a deal had been possible and one technical failure. Uncertainty and the missing outcome →
What did that average look like across individual negotiations?
The buyer earned more in 43 negotiations and the seller in 36. Fourteen agreements split gains equally, thirteen ended in walkaway, and one failed technically.
The distribution shows the size of those differences. Buyer-leading gaps reached 35 points, while seller-leading gaps reached 20. The positive average reflects both how often the buyer earned more and how large those differences were.
How much more did the buyer or seller earn?
Could who started explain the difference?
Equal maximum gains do not make the two bargaining positions identical. One possible difference is who makes the first offer. The buyer started in 51 of these scenarios and the seller in 56, so we checked the results by starting role.
| Who started? | Negotiations | Buyer gain | Seller gain | Buyer − seller |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buyer started | 51 | 15.69 | 11.27 | +4.41 |
| Seller started | 56 | 13.75 | 14.38 | -0.63 |
When the buyer started, it earned more on average. When the seller started, the seller earned slightly more. But these groups contain different scenarios, so we cannot attribute that difference to starting first alone.
To account for the mix of starting roles, we gave buyer-first and seller-first cases equal weight within each scenario category. We kept the same overall mix of tradeoff and narrow-zone scenarios. The buyer’s average lead remained: 1.90 points after balancing, compared with 1.78 points before.
That is a positive result in the recorded data. The remaining question is whether it would persist in another set of negotiations. After balancing starting role and scenario mix, the buyer's lead was 1.90 points, with an exploratory 95% interval of −0.04 to +3.85 points. Appendix F reports the unbalanced version for comparison: a gap of 1.78 points, with a 95% interval of −0.23 to +3.79. It includes no average difference as well as a buyer advantage. This check therefore supports further testing, but does not establish a consistent advantage.
The buyer earned more on average, even when both sides had equal maximum achievable gains. That pattern remained after balancing who started. However, the uncertainty was too wide to conclude that buyers consistently have an advantage in this setting.
Small instruction effects. A buyer lead worth testing again.
We started by asking whether different instructions helped an AI buyer negotiate. Firm instructions made little difference to its average score. Collaborative instructions produced a small improvement. Who the buyer faced also mattered: buyers earned more than early-conceding sellers, but less than late-conceding sellers.
With neutral AI on both sides, the buyer earned more on average. We checked whether unequal maximum gains or the mix of starting roles explained that pattern. The buyer’s lead remained in the equal-maximum scenarios after balancing who started, but the evidence is not yet strong enough to call it a consistent buyer advantage.
The simple lesson is to look beyond whether a deal was reached. Ask what each side gained, what opportunities they had, and whether walking away was the better choice.
We put that buyer lead to a new test.
In Part 2, we reversed the economic opportunities and tested both starting roles. Buyers led in the completed original negotiations, while sellers led in the mirrors. An overall role advantage remains unresolved.
Read How AI negotiates Part 2 →The question we took into Part 2
Next, we would repeat the experiment with who starts and each side’s bargaining opportunities reversed. We would play each scenario with the buyer starting and with the seller starting, and create matching scenarios where the two sides exchange their opportunities. This would help us see whether the buyer’s lead follows the buyer role or the situation it was given.
We would also check whether agents walk away when no deal benefits both sides. If the buyer’s lead persisted, testing other models and opponents would be the next step. For now, the finding belongs to this synthetic game and one model configuration. Details of the proposed next test →
Appendix · Optional details
You can stop reading here. The sections below are for readers who want to explore the methods, detailed results, checks and data.
Everything below stays collapsed until you choose a section. Select a heading, or follow a link from the article, to open the details.
A. Design and scoring
The design contains 180 scenarios: 60 tradeoff, 60 narrow-zone and 60 no-zone. Every scenario is assigned four buyer strategies and three seller strategies. Each side sees its own private values and the public negotiation, not the opponent’s private values. The contract menu contains 168 options: 21 prices from 80 to 180 in steps of five, combined with eight delivery, support and payment bundles.
Value of the bundle
− price − outside option
Price − cost of the bundle
− outside option
An outside option is the value available without this deal. Scores measure improvement over that alternative; walking away gives zero gain. Points are synthetic utility units, not real dollars or human judgments of persuasiveness.
The AI agents use openai/gpt-6.1-sol, medium reasoning, fresh contexts and the OpenAI-only Standard/default route. There is one episode per scenario–policy combination, so the study does not separately estimate repeated-run model variability. The three AI buyer conditions are instruction packages, not an isolated test of tone. Programmed opponents do not interpret persuasive text.
Proposed next test
A fresh study would compare buyer and seller gains using repeated runs of each scenario in both starting orders, with fresh conversations. Matched scenarios would reverse the two sides’ bargaining opportunities. Equal maximum gains alone do not guarantee that the number or pattern of favorable deals is the same for both roles.
Before collecting results, we would fix the main comparison, sample size, meaningful effect size and treatment of technical failures. No-deal scenarios would remain a separate check of whether agents avoid harmful agreements. This was the proposal at Part 1’s publication. The follow-up has now run; Part 2 reports its results and limitations. Limits of the current starting-order check →
↑ Return to what we would test nextB. The five buyer-policy comparisons
Each comparison subtracts the second buyer strategy’s gain from the first, using all 180 scenarios and fixed seller weights. Positive values favor the first strategy. Dots show mean differences; lines show exploratory uncertainty intervals. The five-point margin was defined for these original comparisons only.
The default view uses recorded results, including zero scores for infrastructure failures. The failed-run selector instead fills missing strategic outcomes with legal outcomes unfavorable or favorable to the first strategy in each contrast. These are conservative bounds, not predictions. More on failures below.
The five buyer-policy comparisons
Dots are mean differences in buyer gain. Lines are 99% exploratory intervals. Bounds are conservative missing-outcome scenarios, not predictions.
The recorded collaborative-minus-neutral interval excludes zero. However, the full result remains post-interim amended and exploratory, and some missing-outcome assumptions reverse comparison directions. None of the five recorded estimates reaches the five-point margin; this does not establish equivalence.
↑ Return to the instruction resultsC. Could failed runs change the result?
All 2,160 assignments have terminal dispositions: 1,308 agreements, 838 walkaways and 14 infrastructure failures. The recorded scoring gives failures zero, but their strategic outcomes are unknown. They are not evidence that the agents chose to walk away or would have earned equal gains.
The five comparisons therefore include both unfavorable and favorable legal-outcome bounds for the missing results. Some directions change under these assumptions. Both sets remain available in Figure A1; selecting the favorable one would overstate the evidence.
Complete assignment coverage is distinct from successful operational feasibility, which failed. The final continuation hit a hard-stop rule and drained. Eleven historical infrastructure cases were preserved unchanged; the final segment added three.
Later continuation rules prospectively allowed narrowly evidenced generation-service errors to end an episode as an infrastructure failure. Eligible unavailable billing lookups after a validated saved completion could retain normal scoring while carrying a full charge reserve. Counters and liability limits remained enforced. These policies changed after interim results had been seen, so the combined analysis is permanently post-interim amended and exploratory.
↑ Return to the buyer–seller tableD. Where subgroup comparisons change direction
The frozen analysis includes 17 subgroup reports. Six comparisons have a different sign from their pooled estimate. These are descriptive reversals, not reliable subgroup effects or new tests.
| Scenario or seller subgroup | Buyer comparison | All scenarios | This subgroup |
|---|---|---|---|
| Early programmed seller | Firm − neutral | -0.09 | +0.17 |
| Tradeoffs | Firm − neutral | -0.09 | +0.39 |
| Tradeoffs × Early programmed seller | Firm − neutral | -0.09 | +1.83 |
| Tradeoffs × Neutral Sol seller | Collaborative − neutral | +0.63 | -0.58 |
| Narrow agreement zone × Early programmed seller | Firm − programmed | +2.29 | -0.08 |
| Narrow agreement zone × Late programmed seller | Firm − neutral | -0.09 | +0.17 |
All 17 reports are retained in the downloadable data. The reversals show why a pooled average should not be treated as a universal result for every seller or scenario category.
↑ Return to the instruction resultsE. What changes when we remove the 13 scenarios?
Of the 120 scenarios with mutually acceptable contracts, 107 have equal separate buyer and seller maximum gains over that menu, and 13 have a higher buyer maximum. The excluded IDs are M007, M021, M022, M032, M040, M045, M069, M074, M080, M097, M102, M117 and M139.
Removing them leaves 167 scenarios: 48 tradeoff, 59 narrow-zone and 60 no-zone, or 2,004 assigned negotiations across all 12 pairings. The 107-scenario set further excludes the no-zone cases. In the neutral-AI pairing, the no-zone cases have zero gains for both sides.
| Buyer strategy | Early concessions seller | Late concessions seller | Neutral AI seller |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neutral AI | 10.66 / 5.63 | 6.17 / 10.36 | 9.40 / 8.26 |
| Firm AI | 10.75 / 5.30 | 5.96 / 10.30 | 9.04 / 8.41 |
| Collaborative AI | 11.92 / 5.66 | 6.86 / 10.54 | 9.34 / 8.62 |
| Programmed | 9.73 / 6.32 | 4.64 / 7.72 | 7.19 / 9.55 |
All 14 infrastructure failures remain in the 167-scenario set, scored as zero operationally, with unknown strategic outcomes. The filter changes category weights, potential surplus sizes and first-mover composition; it does not isolate a causal effect of equal maxima. There are 81 buyer-first and 86 seller-first scenarios among the 167, and 51 buyer-first and 56 seller-first among the 107.
Equal attainable maxima do not guarantee symmetric bargaining positions or equal chances of winning. The selection criterion uses pre-existing game parameters, but the decision to examine it was made after seeing results.
The 60 no-zone scenarios, by pairing
Each pairing has 60 assignments, no agreements and zero recorded buyer, seller and joint mean gains. Across all 720 assignments, 713 are saved walkaways and seven are infrastructure failures. No harmful executed deal was recorded. Failure zeros remain unknown strategic outcomes.
| Buyer / seller | Walkaways | Infrastructure failures |
|---|---|---|
| Neutral / Early concessions | 59 | 1 |
| Neutral / Late concessions | 59 | 1 |
| Neutral / Neutral AI | 58 | 2 |
| Firm / Early concessions | 60 | 0 |
| Firm / Late concessions | 60 | 0 |
| Firm / Neutral AI | 59 | 1 |
| Collaborative / Early concessions | 59 | 1 |
| Collaborative / Late concessions | 59 | 1 |
| Collaborative / Neutral AI | 60 | 0 |
| Programmed / Early concessions | 60 | 0 |
| Programmed / Late concessions | 60 | 0 |
| Programmed / Neutral AI | 60 | 0 |
For neutral AI against neutral AI, M062-E01 and M076-E01 are the two infrastructure failures. The other 58 cases ended in walkaway. Including these 60 cases in the 167-scenario mean adds recorded zeros to both sides; excluding them answers the narrower feasible-deal allocation question. Neither view replaces the other.
↑ Return to the broader comparisonF. How uncertain is the buyer–seller gap?
The post-hoc neutral-versus-neutral comparison uses 107 paired episodes: 48 tradeoff and 59 narrow-zone scenarios. The mean buyer-minus-seller gap is 1.7757 points. Its 95% interval is [−0.23, 3.79] and its 99% interval is [−0.98, 4.44]. Neither establishes a reliable role advantage or equivalence.
The intervals use 10,000 whole-scenario bootstrap resamples within category, keeping the buyer and seller from each episode together (PCG64 seed 2026102901). They are conditional on this post-hoc selection, are not adjusted for selecting the question, and do not separately measure repeated-run model variability. No practical margin was set for this new role-gap outcome.
One episode, M180-E12, is an infrastructure failure. Its coherent same-contract legal buyer-minus-seller bounds are −135 and +150. They include potentially harmful legal contracts and are conservative bounds, not forecasts of rational play. The selector shows both alternatives alongside the recorded zero.
Buyer–seller gap and failed-run assumptions
95% exploratory scenario-bootstrap interval. The observed interval crosses zero. The 99% interval is [-0.98, 4.44]. Do not select the favorable sensitivity as the conclusion.
G. How large were the point differences?
Across all 107 assignments, 40.2% had higher buyer gains, 33.6% higher seller gains, 25.2% genuinely equal gains and 0.9% infrastructure failure. Among the 79 unequal outcomes alone, the split is 54.4% versus 45.6%; that conditional split omits ties and the failure and is not a separately tested win-rate claim.
The outcomes of all 107 AI-versus-AI negotiations
Scenario order, not rank order. Select a category to highlight it; all 107 assignments remain visible.
View the point-gap distribution in the main article →
↑ Return to the outcome countsH. Costs and reproducibility
Collection recorded 12,979 actual attempts and 12,974 saved responses. Main-study settled API cost was $55.222314340; including pilots, settled cost was $63.188554384. A separate $0.18888 unknown-charge reserve remained; it is not confirmed spend. There were no active calls at closure.
API dollars are not subtracted from synthetic utility points. These figures cannot establish financial return on investment. No new experimental model calls were made for this article. The first-mover check is a separately documented post-hoc calculation using saved outcomes. Its opening illustration is AI-generated artwork, not research data.
The download includes all plotted aggregates, the 107 exact paired observations, the selected public transcript, the 17 subgroup reports, subset tables and source hashes. Main and post-hoc data are labeled separately. The original frozen evidence remains unchanged.
The study code, scenario definitions and saved results are on GitHub. The package reproduces the article’s numerical results offline, without making new model calls. Its README explains what is included and the limits of reproduction. The chart data and provenance are also available below.
Download chart data and provenance (JSON) ↓↑ Return to what we learned
I. Balancing scenario type and who starts
This additional analysis was requested after inspection of the earlier results. Its plan and weights were fixed and independently checked before computing the new estimates. It remains post-hoc and exploratory.
The four category-by-first-mover cells contain 22 tradeoff/buyer-first, 26 tradeoff/seller-first, 29 narrow-zone/buyer-first and 30 narrow-zone/seller-first scenarios. Within each category, we give the two starter groups equal weight. Category weights remain 48/107 for tradeoffs and 59/107 for narrow-zone cases.
| Scenario type | Buyer started | Seller started | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tradeoffs | 22 | 26 | 48 |
| Narrow agreement zone | 29 | 30 | 59 |
Tradeoff scenarios were 43% of buyer-first cases and 46% of seller-first cases, so buyer-first cases were not disproportionately concentrated in tradeoffs.
| Scenario type | Buyer started | Seller started | Both starting roles weighted equally |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tradeoffs | +7.27 | +1.92 | +4.60 |
| Narrow agreement zone | +2.24 | -2.83 | -0.30 |
After balancing who started, the observed buyer lead was in tradeoff scenarios; narrow-zone scenarios were close to even. These are descriptive averages, not established differences between scenario types. Tradeoff scenarios also offer more total gain to divide. The one technical failure is in the tradeoff/buyer-first group; its recorded zero remains an unknown strategic outcome.
With both starter groups standardized to that same category mix, the buyer-minus-seller gaps are +4.4984 points for buyer-first and −0.6996 for seller-first. Their equal-weight average is +1.8994. The main starter table shows raw group means, which have slightly different category mixes.
Uncertainty uses 10,000 paired whole-scenario bootstrap resamples within the four category-by-starter strata, retaining each stratum’s observed sample size (PCG64 seed 2026102902, linear percentile endpoints). Identical resample indices are used for both failure sensitivities. The single failed case is buyer-first M180-E12; its inherited coherent legal gap bounds are −135 and +150.
| Failed-run assumption | Balanced gap | 95% interval | 99% interval |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recorded results | +1.90 | -0.04 to 3.85 | -0.63 to 4.47 |
| Unfavorable to buyer | +0.52 | -3.26 to 3.49 | -4.77 to 4.11 |
| Favorable to buyer | +3.43 | 0.51 to 7.20 | -0.24 to 8.61 |
This balances the observed first-mover proportions and category mix; it does not make the underlying scenarios identical. No same-scenario order swap was run. The intervals are conditional on the selected subset and chosen follow-up, not adjusted for selection. No new practical threshold, p-value or repeated-run variability estimate is introduced. The favorable sensitivity must not replace the recorded result or the unfavorable bound as the conclusion.
↑ Return to who startedJ. Buyer and seller instructions, in detail
The AI participants used the same model configuration. Each received the shared rules, its private package values or costs, its outside option and the public negotiation history. The following are the actual strategy instructions; “neutral” still means trying to maximize that side’s gain.
Neutral AI buyer
This is the AI baseline. It chooses its own offers, questions and concessions without being told to favor a firm or collaborative approach. Its objective is still to improve the buyer’s position relative to walking away.
Exact strategy instruction, used alongside the shared rules and private information:
Choose offers, questions, concessions and acceptance decisions that best advance the buyer objective. No particular bargaining approach is prescribed.↑ Return to the buyer table
Firm AI buyer
The firm instruction asks for an ambitious opening and cautious concessions, ideally in response to movement from the seller. It explicitly warns against losing a useful agreement merely to appear tough. This changes the suggested bargaining policy, not just the tone of its language.
Exact strategy instruction, used alongside the shared rules and private information:
Begin with an ambitious request in the buyer favor. Defend valuable terms; concede cautiously, preferably for seller movement. Do not lose a beneficial agreement merely to appear tough.↑ Return to the buyer table
Collaborative AI buyer
The collaborative instruction asks the buyer to explore what matters to the seller and find exchanges that are cheap for one side and valuable to the other. It is still a self-interested buyer: the instruction explicitly says not to sacrifice its expected gain for the seller’s welfare.
Exact strategy instruction, used alongside the shared rules and private information:
Explore seller priorities. Propose trades inexpensive for one party and valuable to the other. Explain constructive exchanges while protecting buyer gain. Do not sacrifice buyer expected value to improve seller welfare.↑ Return to the buyer table
Programmed buyer
This buyer follows a fixed rule and makes no model calls. Its target begins at 80% of its own highest legal gain, then falls by 16 percentage points on each of its turns, reaching zero on its sixth decision.
| Decision 1 | Decision 2 | Decision 3 | Decision 4 | Decision 5 | Decision 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 80% | 64% | 48% | 32% | 16% | 0% |
These targets use the agent’s own highest gain across all 168 legal contracts, with a minimum of zero. That contract need not be acceptable to the other side. The policy sees only its own private values; it does not know the other side’s costs or values.
It accepts a live offer when its own gain meets the current target. Otherwise, it proposes a qualifying contract that changes the fewest delivery, support and payment terms from the opponent’s most recent valid offer. With no prior offer, it starts from standard delivery, basic support and immediate payment. Among equally close bundles, the buyer chooses the highest qualifying price and the seller the lowest; contract ID breaks any remaining tie.
In the final shared slot, it accepts a live offer with nonnegative gain or walks away. With no qualifying contract earlier, it also walks away. It never asks a query and does not interpret persuasive messages. “Decision number” counts that agent’s own turns, not all turns in the negotiation.
↑ Return to the buyer tableEarly-conceding programmed seller
This seller begins by targeting its own highest legal gain, then reduces that target quickly. By its second decision, it is willing to accept about 55.3% of that maximum. “Early concessions” describes the schedule of its target, not a guarantee of the final price or outcome.
| Decision 1 | Decision 2 | Decision 3 | Decision 4 | Decision 5 | Decision 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100% | 55.3% | 36.8% | 22.5% | 10.6% | 0% |
Exact rule: target = maximum × (1 − √((t − 1) / 5)), where t is its own decision number. Percentages above are rounded.
These targets use the agent’s own highest gain across all 168 legal contracts, with a minimum of zero. That contract need not be acceptable to the other side. The policy sees only its own private values; it does not know the other side’s costs or values.
It accepts a live offer when its own gain meets the current target. Otherwise, it proposes a qualifying contract that changes the fewest delivery, support and payment terms from the opponent’s most recent valid offer. With no prior offer, it starts from standard delivery, basic support and immediate payment. Among equally close bundles, the buyer chooses the highest qualifying price and the seller the lowest; contract ID breaks any remaining tie.
In the final shared slot, it accepts a live offer with nonnegative gain or walks away. With no qualifying contract earlier, it also walks away. It never asks a query and does not interpret persuasive messages. “Decision number” counts that agent’s own turns, not all turns in the negotiation.
↑ Return to the seller tableLate-conceding programmed seller
This seller holds a high target for longer. On its second decision it still requires 99.2% of its own maximum gain, with larger concessions later. It uses the same offer-selection and acceptance rules as the early-conceding seller; the target schedule is what differs.
| Decision 1 | Decision 2 | Decision 3 | Decision 4 | Decision 5 | Decision 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100% | 99.2% | 93.6% | 78.4% | 48.8% | 0% |
Exact rule: target = maximum × (1 − ((t − 1) / 5)³), where t is its own decision number.
These targets use the agent’s own highest gain across all 168 legal contracts, with a minimum of zero. That contract need not be acceptable to the other side. The policy sees only its own private values; it does not know the other side’s costs or values.
It accepts a live offer when its own gain meets the current target. Otherwise, it proposes a qualifying contract that changes the fewest delivery, support and payment terms from the opponent’s most recent valid offer. With no prior offer, it starts from standard delivery, basic support and immediate payment. Among equally close bundles, the buyer chooses the highest qualifying price and the seller the lowest; contract ID breaks any remaining tie.
In the final shared slot, it accepts a live offer with nonnegative gain or walks away. With no qualifying contract earlier, it also walks away. It never asks a query and does not interpret persuasive messages. “Decision number” counts that agent’s own turns, not all turns in the negotiation.
↑ Return to the seller tableNeutral AI seller
The seller uses the same model and reasoning setting as the AI buyers, but receives the seller’s private costs and outside option. Its instruction is to maximize seller gain. No firm or collaborative seller instruction was tested.
Exact strategy instruction, used alongside the shared rules and private information:
Choose offers, questions, concessions and acceptance decisions to maximize seller expected gain above its outside option. No particular bargaining approach is prescribed.↑ Return to the seller table
K. How the scenarios were made, with examples
Each scenario specifies a buyer’s base value, a seller’s base cost, how much each of three extras adds to those values or costs, and each side’s outside option. Prices range from 80 to 180 in steps of five. Standard or rush delivery, basic or extended support, and immediate payment or payment in 60 days create eight bundles. Together, that gives 168 legal contracts.
A mutually acceptable contract gives both parties at least zero gain above their alternatives. The category is determined by examining that contract menu before any negotiation takes place.
Tradeoff scenarios · 60 scenarios
Different terms create opportunities for useful exchanges. A feature can be valuable to the buyer but cheap for the seller, while a different feature costs more than it is worth.
Exact selection rule. The best combined gain among mutually acceptable contracts must be at least 30 points. At least two extras must have buyer value minus seller cost of 10 points or more, and at least one extra must have that difference at −5 points or less.
One saved example: M003. In M003, rush delivery adds 20 of buyer value but costs the seller 10; payment in 60 days adds 15 of value and no cost. Extended support adds no buyer value but costs the seller 20. Those differences create opportunities to include helpful extras and leave out an unhelpful one.
| Side | Base | Rush delivery | Extended support | Pay in 60 days | Outside option |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buyer value | 110 | 20 | 0 | 15 | 0 |
| Seller cost | 80 | 10 | 20 | 0 | 5 |
Extras are added to the base when selected; the outside option is deducted when calculating gain. The saved design lists 52 mutually acceptable contracts. Their maximum combined gain is 50 points. This is an illustration of the scenario’s inputs, not a selected negotiation outcome. The example is the first scenario by ID in this category.
↑ Return to the scenario tableNarrow agreement-zone scenarios · 60 scenarios
A deal can benefit both parties, but there is relatively little total gain to share above their alternatives.
Exact selection rule. The best combined gain among mutually acceptable contracts must be between 5 and 15 points, inclusive. At least one available contract must give both parties strictly positive gain.
One saved example: M002. In M002, the highest combined gain available from a mutually acceptable contract is 15 points. Extended support adds 25 of buyer value and 20 of seller cost, while rush delivery costs more than the buyer values it.
| Side | Base | Rush delivery | Extended support | Pay in 60 days | Outside option |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buyer value | 135 | 15 | 25 | 0 | 0 |
| Seller cost | 115 | 25 | 20 | 25 | 10 |
Extras are added to the base when selected; the outside option is deducted when calculating gain. The saved design lists 10 mutually acceptable contracts. Their maximum combined gain is 15 points. This is an illustration of the scenario’s inputs, not a selected negotiation outcome. The example is the first scenario by ID in this category.
↑ Return to the scenario tableNo agreement-zone scenarios · 60 scenarios
There is no available contract that leaves both sides at least as well off as walking away. One side might gain from a deal, but only while the other does worse than its alternative.
Exact selection rule. None of the 168 legal contracts may give both parties nonnegative gain above their outside options. This is checked directly; a zero recorded score alone does not define this category.
One saved example: M001. In M001, the buyer’s alternative is worth 20 and the seller’s 15. Even with the available extras and prices, no contract satisfies both sides’ minimum requirements. Walking away preserves their alternatives and earns zero additional gain.
| Side | Base | Rush delivery | Extended support | Pay in 60 days | Outside option |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buyer value | 110 | 0 | 30 | 15 | 20 |
| Seller cost | 100 | 30 | 25 | 25 | 15 |
Extras are added to the base when selected; the outside option is deducted when calculating gain. The saved design lists 0 mutually acceptable contracts. There is no mutually acceptable contract. This is an illustration of the scenario’s inputs, not a selected negotiation outcome. The example is the first scenario by ID in this category.
↑ Return to the scenario tableSampling and assignment
The generator drew each private parameter uniformly from its allowed grid: buyer base value 110–150, seller base cost 80–120, each extra’s value or cost 0–30, and each outside option 0–20, all in steps of five. It retained scenarios meeting one of the three definitions until each category contained 60. Conditioning on those definitions means the final sample is not a uniform sample of all possible bargaining situations.
The fixed draw produced 738 candidates: 180 were selected, 496 did not meet any category definition, and 62 belonged to a category whose quota was full. Complete private parameter vectors from both earlier pilots were excluded, and the main sample contains no duplicates. The data seed was 20261025041 and the schedule seed 20261025042.
Each category had 30 buyer-first and 30 seller-first scenarios. A scenario’s starting role stayed the same across all 12 buyer–seller combinations. Scenario categories were interleaved and matchup order was randomized. Thus the original design balanced starting roles across categories, but did not run the same scenario with its order reversed.
The examples above use M001, M002 and M003 because they are the first saved IDs in their categories. All 180 scenario definitions, the exact AI prompts and source hashes are available below. These are synthetic game inputs, not private information about real people.
Download instructions and all 180 scenario definitions (JSON) ↓
Transcribed from the frozen game, prompts, scenario file and preparation record. No scenarios were regenerated and no negotiation outcomes were recalculated for this appendix.
↑ Return to the scenario tablePublished October 29, 2026 · Saved experimental results and a separate post-hoc analysis. Charts and filters change the view, not the evidence.
